




1  TITLE 3 
 
1.1  Introduction 
University reporting requirements are governed by Australian Accounting 
Standards, the Guidelines issued by the Commonwealth Department of Education, 
Science and Training (DEST) and the relevant state legislation governing the university.  
In terms of Vice-Chancellor’s remuneration, universities are required to disclose as a 
note to the accounts the aggregate amount of remuneration to all directors and the 
number of executives falling within each $10,000 band, commencing at $100,000 
(Australian Accounting Research Foundation, 1993; Australian Accounting Standards 
Board, 1997; Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs, 2000).  This 
chapter discusses the sources of data used throughout the dissertation.  More detailed 
versions of the annual report database are contained in Appendix A3 and the attached 
CD. 
 
1.2  The Challenges of Data Collection 
Data for this project is primarily sourced from university annual reports and 
financial statements.  All regression data used in this dissertation is available in 
Appendix A3.  Preliminary attempts to source data uncovered some difficulties in 
obtaining this dataset; namely that requests to universities generally resulted in poor 
results.  The common problems cited were (1) that copies of prior reports were not held, 
(2) that copies were held but not available for distribution, or (3) non-response.   
Enquiries made to the Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee (AVCC) also proved 
fruitless. An enquiry was made to the National Tertiary Education Union who 
responded with some data collected from annual reports, however this was not a 
complete dataset, as the majority of universities were excluded and the set only included 
data for three years.  The Auditor-General for Western Australia also held some copies 
of reports but their dataset was confined to universities in Western Australia.  Other 
enquiries made to DEST and the Western Australia Department of Education and 
Training were also unsuccessful, as they do not collect the data. 
 
Due to time and financial constraints, it was not feasible to travel to each  
individual university to obtain the data from university library holdings.  Given that 
insufficient data was obtained from direct requests at each university, the alternative 
plan was to travel to the National Library of Australia in Canberra to obtain the required 
data.  An examination of the National Library’s catalogue shows they hold most of the 
required annual reports, shown in Table 1.1.  Figure 1.1 shows the number of university 
reports held by the National Library by year.  This shows that data for a meaningful 




















Notes:  The distribution relates to National Library of Australia catalogue holdings, found 
through an advanced keyword (annual report) and author (name of university) 




                                                 
1 University annual reports for the year ended 31 December 2003 were in the process of being prepared 
and published at the time of data collection (July 2004).  As such, the majority of these reports were 
unavailable as they had not been lodged at the National Library, nor were they published on the majority 
of university websites.  
Table 1.1 
NATIONAL LIBRARY OF AUSTRALIA CATALOGUE RECORD HOLDINGS
1 
 University  Date Range of 
Available Data 
 University  Date Range of 
Available Data 
1.  Australian Catholic University  1996-2002  22.  Swinburne University of Technology  1995-2002 
2.  Australian Defence Force Academy  1986-2002  23.  The University of Melbourne  1998-2002 
3.  Australian National University`  1993-2002  24.  The University of New England  1985-2002 
4.  Bond University  None  25.  The University of New South Wales
3 1992-2001 
5.  Central Queensland University  1992-1994  26.  The University of Newcastle  1996-2002 
6. Charles  Darwin  University
2  None  27.  The University of Queensland  1981-2002 
7.  Charles Sturt University  1990-2002  28.  The University of Sydney  1998-2002 
8.  Curtin University of Technology  1987-2002  29.  The University of Western Australia  1992-2003 
9.  Deakin University  1996-2002  30.  University of Adelaide  1994-2002 
10.  Edith Cowan University  1991-2002  31.  University of Ballarat  1978-2003 
11. Flinders  University  1980-1990  32.  University  of  Canberra  1996-2000 
12.  Griffith University  1972-2002  33.  University of Notre Dame  None 
13.  James Cook University  1994-2002  34.  University of South Australia
4 1996-1997 
14.  La Trobe University  None  35.  University of Southern Queensland  1992-2002 
15.  Macquarie University  1991-2002  36.  University of Tasmania  1986-2003 
16.  Monash University  1990-2002  37.  University of Technology Sydney  1988-2002 
17.  Murdoch University  1973-2002  38.  University of the Sunshine Coast  2002 
18. Northern  Territory  University
2  1989-2002  39.  University of Western Sydney  1989-2001 
19.  Queensland University of Technology  None  40.  University of Wollongong  1987-2002 
20.  Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology  1994-2002  41.  Victoria University
5 1995-2002 
21.  Southern Cross University  1994-2002       
Notes:  1.  National Library of Australia catalogue holdings were found through an advanced keyword (annual report) and author (name of university) search.  The most recent continuous 
  time period of holdings as at May 2004 is reported. 
2.  Alice Springs Centralian College merged with Northern Territory University in 2004 to become known as Charles Darwin University. 
3.  The listing for The University of New South Wales lists this as the Annual Report for the Council. 
4.  University of South Australia has a separate listing for Financial Statements available for the years 1993-1995. 
5.  Victoria University records are listed under the author Victoria University of Technology.  
It is a requirement for any publication printed in Australia to be lodged at the 
National Library of Australia.  However, the onus for lodgement rests with the 
publishers and as was discovered, in the case of university annual reports, not all 
universities have done this.  La Trobe and Bond University, for example, have not 
lodged any copies of their annual reports at the National Library.  Other universities, for 
which the National Library catalogue records indicate reports are held, have not lodged 
the entire report; for example, the University of Queensland have neglected to lodge 
their financial statements in many instances.  Other institutions, such as the University 
of South Australia, have not lodged reports for all years.  In an attempt to further fill 
gaps in the dataset, the State Library of New South Wales was also visited.  After 
repeated requests to the universities themselves, some institutions also provided annual 
reports.  There are some notable anomalies in relation to the availability of data; for 
example, the University of Western Sydney has not lodged their 2002 report with the 
National Library or the State Library of New South Wales.  A search of the University 
of Western Sydney Library catalogue records also fails to locate a copy within the 
university’s own library!  A copy of the financial statements is not available from the 
University webpage. 
 
There is substantial variation in the quality and quantity of disclosure across 
institutions relating to Vice-Chancellor remuneration.  Institutions in Western Australia 
report relatively early while those in New South Wales and Queensland report relatively 
late.  Overall, in terms of data, the set covers 37 institutions
2 over eight years (1995-
2002), yielding a total of 37 8 296 × =  theoretically available observations.  Of these, 
data availability constraints regarding Vice-Chancellor remuneration reduced the 
number of observations to 179 across 34 of the 39 institutions in Australia, accounting 
for 60 percent of the total number of theoretically available observations.  Figure 1.2 
shows the proportion of institution observations by year.  The figure shows that there is 
greater success in obtaining data for the period 2000-2002, reflecting the change in 
disclosure requirements requiring mandatory disclosure of remuneration that came into 
effect in 2000.  The institutions where remuneration data was not available are the 
University of South Australia, Bond University, Notre Dame University, Flinders 
University and Charles Darwin University.  The University of South Australia reports 
obtained did not include notes to the financial statements or an audit report, hence the 
required disclosures were not available and it would have been unclear if the figures 
                                                 
2 The institutions where no data has been collected are Notre Dame University and Flinders University.  
could have been reasonably relied upon.  Bond University has not lodged copies of their 
annual report at the National Library.  They released the first publicly available report in 
2000
3 although the reports obtained did not include financial statements.  Notre Dame 
University has not lodged reports at the National Library of Australia and responded to 
all requests made directly to the university for their annual reports with the statement 
that “Notre Dame is a private university and doesn’t release annual reports or other 
financial statements…I have been asked to supply them [to others] over the years and 
the answer from our finance department is always no” (Oliver, 2004).  Flinders 
University has not lodged annual reports at the National Library of Australia for the 
years covered in the sample.  Charles Darwin University
4 has lodged reports at the 
National Library but remuneration is not disclosed in the notes to the financial 
statements.  It is possible that the variation in disclosure and the difficulty in obtaining 
this data reflects either a lack of demand from stakeholders for information or a ploy by 
the institution to deflect accountability (da Silva Rosa, 2004).  It appears that the first 
possibility is unlikely to drive the poor quality of disclosure, given that there has been 
considerable stakeholder interest for these institutions to increase disclosure.  For 
example, in 2000, the New South Wales Auditor-General conducted a special review on 
Chief Executive Officer contracts (Audit Office of New South Wales, 2000) and in 
2002 Senator Carr asked questions in the Senate relating to how public resources were 
being used in universities.  With universities finding it increasingly difficult to avoid 
responsibility for their actions, it will be of interest to see if they improve the quality 
and quantity of their disclosures in the future. 
 
Figure 1.2 












                                                 
3 Available from the university homepage http://www.bond.edu.au/exec/council.htm.  Bond University 
commenced operations in 1989, hence for 11 years the annual reports have not been available to the 
public. 
4 Formerly Northern Territory University (until 2004).  
 
1.3  Vice-Chancellor Remuneration and Biographical Information 
In terms of the disclosure of Vice-Chancellor remuneration, the remuneration of 
the Vice-Chancellor was taken to be the midpoint of the top band reported.  Some cross-
checks were made to ensure reasonableness of this assumption by obtaining the list of 
university Council members for reasonable assurance that the Vice-Chancellor would be 
the most highly paid.  Intuitively this would be expected if the Vice-Chancellor is taken 
to be the Chief Executive Officer of the institution.  The quality and consistency of the 
disclosures themselves, however, is questionable.  Some institutions include 
superannuation benefits while others exclude it and the structure of remuneration is, in 
the majority of cases, not disclosed.  No attempt was made to impute the superannuation 
contribution where this was excluded from the remuneration number disclosed, as Vice-
Chancellors may voluntarily choose to contribute to superannuation more than that 
required under law.  Again, there were no means to verify whether or not this was the 
case.  It was also pointed out (Anonymous, 2004) that some institutions also vary what 
is disclosed under the remuneration figure from year to year.  In some cases, certain 
non-cash fringe benefits will be included in one year and excluded in others.  In others, 
the remuneration paid for the year, rather than the total remuneration payable, will be 
disclosed.  This will distort the figures, particularly for those individuals who have only 
been present for part of the year.  Further, where termination or long service payments 
are made, this will inflate the figure for the period.  Table 1.2 lists Vice-Chancellor 
remuneration in 2002.  Monash University is a clear outlier due to the resignation of the 
Vice-Chancellor, Professor David Robinson, in 2002. 
 
Biographical data on current and past Vice-Chancellors was obtained from 
Who’s Who in Australia (de Micheli and Herd, 2003) and also from direct requests at 
each individual university’s Vice-Chancellery.  The AVCC provided a list of current 
and past Vice-Chancellors with their terms of office, however this proved to have severe 
data integrity issues with the majority of the terms of office listed being incorrect.  In 
fact, some listed dates were before the individual in question was even born!  Checks 
were made against Who’s Who in Australia and details provided by University Vice-
Chancelleries to verify the date of birth and details of the Vice-Chancellor’s educational 
background and term of office. 
  
Table 1.2 
RANKING OF VICE-CHANCELLOR REMUNERATION IN 2002 
 Institution  Remuneration  ($)
1. University of Tasmania  225,000 
2. University of Ballarat  235,000 
3. Central Queensland University  265,000 
4. University of the Sunshine Coast  265,000 
5. University of Adelaide  285,000 
6. James Cook University  295,000 
7. University of New South Wales  295,000 
8. University of Southern Queensland  295,000 
9. University of New England  305,000 
10. Charles Sturt University  310,000 
11. University of Newcastle  315,000 
12. Murdoch University  335,000 
13. Swinburne University  335,000 
14. Curtin University of Technology  365,000 
15. University of Canberra  385,000 
16. Edith Cowan University  395,000 
17. University of Technology Sydney  395,000 
18. La Trobe University  405,000 
19. RMIT  405,000 
20. QUT  415,000 
21. University of Wollongong  435,000 
22. Victoria University  455,000 
23. Australian National University  465,000 
24. Southern Cross University  465,000 
25. Deakin University  475,000 
26. Macquarie University  495,000 
27. University of Sydney  495,000 
28. University of Melbourne  505,000 
29. University of Western Australia  555,000 
30. University of Queensland  705,000 
31. Monash University  1,155,000 
Source: University Annual Reports. 
 
1.4  Interviews with Vice-Chancellors 
University of Western Australia Human Research Ethics Committee approval 
has been granted to interview Vice-Chancellors.  Questions asked relate to their role as 
a Vice-Chancellor as well as questions about their vision for the university and whom 
they admire.
5  For those sceptical about the value of this information, the inspiration 
behind these interviews is to obtain similar information to that of Siegfried (1997) who 
looks at the value of economist Presidents.  As such, some questions asked are phrased 
so as to elicit responses that will give comparable data.  In addition, starting in February 
2004, the Australian Financial Review publishes an Education section weekly.   
                                                 
5 This is available in Appendix A1.  
Occasionally, this includes a “Question and Answer” section with the Vice-Chancellor 
of an Australian university.  These interviews were also used to glean some insight into 
the role of a Vice-Chancellor.  Four Vice-Chancellors were interviewed.  These 
individuals may not be identified for confidentiality reasons, however the Vice-
Chancellors are not exclusively from Western Australia.  From this, some (relatively 
crude, due to the small sample size) comparisons will be made between the attitudes of 
Australian Vice-Chancellors and United States Presidents. 
 
1.5  Other Financial Variables 
The financial variables used in regression analyses are remuneration, earnings, 
total assets and revenue.  Table 1.3 shows summary statistics of these variables.  Note 
that the summary statistics are for the variables independent of each other.  When they 
are used in regression analysis some observations have been dropped due to missing 
values in other variables used in the same model.  Looking at the standard errors, we 
can see that there is more dispersion in size as measured by total assets than revenue.  
However, when looking at the relative dispersion
6  of the two variables, revenue is 
comparatively flat compared to earnings.
7   Over the period 1995-2002, the relative 
dispersion of revenue is 4 percent, while earnings is more than double that at 9 percent.  
For each year in the sample, revenue has lower relative dispersion than earnings and the 
dispersion is more or less flat over time, while the relative dispersion of earnings is 
more volatile over the years.  Panels B to I show the summary statistics for these 
variables by year.  The relatively high dispersion of total assets may reflect differences 
in the recognition and valuation of assets on the balance sheet across institutions.   
Further, for each year, there are always fewer disclosures for remuneration relative to 
the other variables.  This reflects that remuneration is disclosed in the notes to the 
financial statements while the other variables are disclosed in the main statements 
themselves.  Institutions may not include the notes to the statements in the reports filed 
at the National Library but the summary statements are typically included. 
 
House price data from Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) was kindly 
provided by the Housing Industry Association,
8 who produce the publication entitled 
“Review of Housing Affordability” together with CBA.  The data collected by CBA is 
                                                 
6 Calculated as the standard error divided by the mean. 
7 This is further explored in Chapter 4: Dimensions of Earnings Quality. 
8 Thanks to Harley Dale from the Housing Industry Association for providing the data.  
on lending to owner-occupiers once they have agreed to provide funds for a purchase.  
The Reserve Bank of Australia (2004) comments that a major advantage of this data is 
that it refers to transactions at some point between contract and settlement and hence are 
more timely than settlement-dated figures (such as that collected by the Real Estate 
Institute of Australia).  Further, the data is not subject to revision and has a finer degree 
of detail as prices are split between state/territory capitals (excluding Darwin) and the 
rest of the state (excluding Northern Territory).  When attributing this to universities, 
the location of the university was taken to be the location of the Vice-Chancellery.  A 
disadvantage of this data is that although CBA is a large national lender, the sample 
may not be representative of all transactions and may have changed over time.  Also, 
the data does not capture sales where the purchaser does not borrow for purchase. 
 
To control for the effects of inflation, monetary amounts are typically expressed 
in constant 1996 dollars.  Consumer Price Index data was obtained from the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics.
9  The deflator used was the index for Australia.
10 
 
CEO remuneration data was obtained from Lieu’s (2003) Honours dissertation 
on Australia’s participation in the global market for CEOs.  It includes firms among the 
top 125 in Australia (ranked by market capitalisation) during the years 1999-2003.   
Remuneration has been pro-rated for a full year of work, in the case that the CEO left 
the position mid-way through the year.  For CEOs paid in foreign currency, 
remuneration has been converted to Australian dollars based on the rate as at annual 
reporting date.  The sample consists of 124 company years. 
 
 
                                                 
9 The data is taken from time series spreadsheet 6401.0 Consumer Price Index, Australia, Table 1A: All 
Groups, Index Numbers (Financial Year).  The base used for the index numbers is 1989-90 = 100.0 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2004c). 
10 As opposed to a state specific deflator.  
Table 1.3 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF FINANCIAL VARIABLES 
Assets Revenue Earnings Remuneration  Assets Revenue Earnings Remuneration 
($'000) ($'000) ($'000)  ($)  ($'000) ($'000) ($'000)  ($) 
A.  1995-2002  C.  1996 
Mean 698,721 276,947 13,357 335,112  605,216 239,010 12,026 244,667 
Median 507,366 228,807 8,472 305,000  418,556 202,115 8,912 230,000 
Standard Error  38,275 12,055 1,138 11,239  98,080 27,553 2,237 20,922 
Minimum 61,604 32,520 -25,335 165,000  89,737 50,887 -2,307 165,000 
Maximum 3,075,610 954,452 96,812 1,605,000  2,725,987 603,721 46,451 505,000 
Observations 264 256 256 179  34 34 34 15 
Skewness 1.90 1.38 2.01 4.52  2.11 1.16 1.33 2.58 
Kurtosis 3.60 1.49 5.13 32.36  5.15 .41 1.11 8.17 
B.  1995     D.  1997 
Mean 572,766 225,709 18,993 249,333  634,988 249,198 12,341 287,941 
Median 391,293 196,560 12,178 215,000  456,040 207,514 10,637 295,000 
Standard Error  100,086 33,526 4,877 22,205  98,857 28,758 2,194 18,546 
Minimum 85,910 59,307 -10,261 165,000  97,230 52,622 -8,573 185,000 
Maximum 2,618,896 583,864 80,541 455,000  2,662,911 627,217 42,561 495,000 
Observations 31 23 23 15  33 33 33 17 
Skewness 2.21 1.23 1.16 1.51  2.01 1.12 .80 1.04 
Kurtosis 5.59 .48 .76 1.66  4.52 .20 .24 2.28 
  Continued on next page…
  
Table 1.3 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF FINANCIAL VARIABLES (continued) 
Assets Revenue Earnings Remuneration  Assets Revenue Earnings Remuneration 
($'000) ($'000) ($'000)  ($)  ($'000) ($'000) ($'000)  ($) 
E.  1998     G.  2000 
Mean 682,946 260,336 12,090 282,813  754,149 284,417 11,022 349,844 
Median 501,215 225,319 9,545 275,000  579,767 237,001 7,332 330,000 
Standard Error  107,542 30,377 1,843 15,076  110,835 31,874 2,957 16,764 
Minimum 147,145 74,552 -1,149 175,000  150,738 84,489 -25,335 245,000 
Maximum 2,818,189 648,219 33,771 385,000  2,744,818 749,392 65,477 645,000 
Observations 32 32 32 16  34 34 34 32 
Skewness 2.00 1.20 .51 .04  1.79 1.21 1.22 1.39 
Kurtosis 4.29 .42 -.81 -.56  3.06 .55 2.78 1.87 
F.  1999     H.  2001 
Mean 709,313 265,749 10,985 303,810  797,914 326,007 17,079 401,563 
Median 572,570 235,065 4,849 285,000  669,158 278,101 10,310 340,000 
Standard Error  105,642 29,374 3,168 11,982  117,764 38,446 4,154 42,304 
Minimum 146,409 75,323 -3,743 205,000  61,604 33,697 -7,536 205,000 
Maximum 2,787,229 683,745 96,812 405,000  2,940,558 847,430 96,198 1,605,000 
Observations 33 33 33 21  34 34 34 32 
Skewness 1.92 1.18 3.49 .52  1.79 1.20 1.96 4.34 
Kurtosis 3.90 .55 15.59 -.39  3.24 .65 3.40 21.83 
  Continued on next page…
  
Table 1.3 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF FINANCIAL VARIABLES (continued) 
Assets Revenue Earnings Remuneration  Assets Revenue Earnings Remuneration 
($'000) ($'000) ($'000)  ($)  ($'000) ($'000) ($'000)  ($) 
I.  2002      
Mean 822,516 348,561 13,990 410,645 
Median 681,704 285,889 7,853 395,000 
Standard Error  126,161 45,310 4,000 31,214 
Minimum 65,036 32,520 -11,717 225,000 
Maximum 3,075,610 954,452 85,303 1,155,000 
Observations 33 33 33 31 
Skewness 1.89 1.29 1.81 2.82 
Kurtosis 3.81 .75 2.80 10.93 
Source: University Annual Reports.  
Australian Research Council (ARC) grant funding data was obtained from 
“Selected Statistics” publications for Discovery Projects for 2001-2003 from the ARC 
website.
11  The data lists the amount requested and allocated for each year of research 
and the total by institution.  Large grant funding data for the period 1998-2000 was 
obtained from the Commonwealth Department of Education, Science and Training 
(DEST).
12  DEST publishes a Higher Education Funding Report for a period of three 
years (Triennium)
13  in which they disclose the amount allocated under the Large 
Research Grants Scheme for new and ongoing projects by institution.
14 
 
1.6  Non-Financial Data 
Data for the number of award course completions was obtained from DEST 
“Selected Higher Education Statistics Series: Students 2003”.
15  The relevant data is 
disclosed under Appendix 2.3
16 for the years 1993 to 2002.  This was aggregated over 
all years and the proportion of award completions for all students, both domestic and 
overseas, has been used.  Details of the broad field of education classification were 
obtained from the publication “Students 2002: Selected Higher Education Statistics”
17 
under Appendix 4.  The broad field is a two digit code that represents a grouping of a 
major field of education. This is then extended to a narrow field (four digit code, 
including the two digit code of the broad field) and a detailed field (six digit code, 
including the narrow field and broad field codes) (DEST, 2002d).  Table 1.4 lists the 
twelve broad fields, breaking this down further into the narrow fields they encompass. 
 
Data on staff and student equity group participation is also sourced from DEST 
“Selected Higher Education Statistics Series: Students 2003”
15 and “Staff 2003”.
18  The 
student data is taken from Appendix 3.3
19 for the 2003 year.  The staff data is taken 
                                                 
11   The data is available from http://www.arc.gov.au/funded_grants/selection_discovery_projects.htm.  
Details of funding by university are available from the reports under the heading Budget Statistics by 
Institution.  The total allocated to each institution has been used. 
12  Formerly the Commonwealth Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth Affairs 
(DEETYA, until 1999), then the Commonwealth Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs 
(DETYA, until 2002). 
13 For example, the 1998-2000 Triennium. 
14 The amount allocated for total projects, both new and ongoing has been used.  The publications are 
available from http://www.dest.gov.au/highered/previous_otherpub.htm. 
15 This is available from http://www.dest.gov.au/highered/statpubs.htm#studpubs. 
16 Award Course Completions for All Students by Citizenship and Broad Field of Education, 1993 to 
2002. 
17 Available from http://www.dest.gov.au/highered/statistics/students/02/student_table/students2002.pdf. 
18 This is available from http://www.dest.gov.au/highered/statpubs.htm#staffpubs. 
19 All Domestic Students by State, Institution and Equity Group, 2003.  
from Tables 6, 21 and 23.
20  Data for the number and classification of staff is from 
Table 7.
21  Data for student equivalent full time student units (EFTSU) is also taken 
from these series for the years 1998 to 2002.
22 
 
Data on student/staff ratios was obtained from the Australian Vice-Chancellors’ 
Committee
23 who publish this data by dividing student load expressed in EFTSU by 
staff expressed in teaching staff full-time equivalent (FTE).  The AVCC note that staff 
FTE includes full-time and fractional full-time staff with work functions “teaching” and 
“teaching and research” only while EFTSU includes overseas and non-overseas 
students. 
 
Data on the size of Australian university councils was obtained from the 
Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee
24   who published details on Council 
membership for the 38 member universities
25 as at May 2003. 
 
 
                                                 
20 Table 6 shows FTE (full-time equivalent) for Full-time, Fractional Full-time and Estimated Casual 
Staff by State, Institution, Work Contract and Gender, 2003.  Table 21 shows FTE for Full-time and 
Fractional Full-time Indigenous Staff by State, Institution, Function and Gender, 2003 and Table 23 
shows FTE for Full-time and Fractional Full-time Academic Staff by State, Institution, Highest 
Qualification and Gender, 2003.  The results using the number of staff is comparable. 
21 FTE for Full-time and Fractional Full-time Staff by State, Institution, Current Duties Classification and 
Gender, 2003. 
22 The data for 1998 is from Selected Higher Education Student Statistics, 1998 (DETYA, 1998); Table 
42: Student load (EFTSU) for All Students by State, Institution and Broad Level of Course, 1998.  The 
data for 1999 is from Students 1999: Selected Higher Education Statistics (DETYA, 1999); Table 55: 
Actual Student Load (EFTSU) for All Students by State, Institution and Broad Level of Course, 1999.  
Data for 2000-2002 is from the “Students: Selected Higher Education Statistics” series for the relevant 
year (available from http://www.dest.gov.au/highered/statpubs.htm#studpubs).  For the 2000 year, Table 
43 shows Actual Student Load (EFTSU) for All Students by State, Institution and Broad Level of Course, 
2000.  For 2001, the data is taken from Table 49: Actual Student Load (EFTSU) for All Students by State, 
Institution and Broad Level of Course, 2001.  For 2002, the data is from Table 37: Actual Student Load 
(EFTSU) for All Students by State, Institution and Broad Level of Course, 2002.  Data for onshore 
students for 2001 is from Table 53: Actual Student Load (EFTSU) for All Onshore Students by State, 
Institution and Academic Organisational Unit Group, 2001 while that for 2002 is sourced from Table 44: 
Actual Student Load (EFTSU) for All Onshore Students by State, Institution and Academic 
Organisational Unit Group, 2002. 
23  Available  at  http://www.avcc.edu.au/policies_activities/resource_analysis/key_stats/student_staff_ 
ratios.htm. 
24  Available  at  http://www.avcc.edu.au/australias_unis/summaries_key_uni_practices/organisational_ 
structure/const_governing_bodies/index.htm. 
25 Notre Dame University is excluded from the sample as they are not a member of the AVCC.  
Table 1.4 
BROAD AND NARROW FIELDS OF EDUCATION 
  Broad Field  Narrow Field        Broad Field  Narrow Field 
1.  Natural and Physical Sciences  Mathematical Sciences      4.  Architecture and Building  Architecture and Urban Environment 
   Physics  and  Astronomy         Building 
    Chemical Sciences      5.  Agriculture, Environmental and 
Related Studies 
Agriculture 
    Earth Sciences          Horticulture and Viticulture 
   Biological  Sciences         Forestry  Studies 
    Other Natural and Physical Sciences          Fisheries Studies 
2.  Information Technology  Computer Science          Environmental Studies 
    Information Systems          Other Agriculture, Environmental and 
Related Studies 
    Other Information Technology      6.  Health  Medical Studies 
3. Engineering  and  Related 
Technologies 
Manufacturing Engineering and 
Technology 
       Nursing 
    Process and Resources Engineering          Pharmacy 
   Automotive  Engineering  and 
Technology 
       Dental  Studies 
    Mechanical and Industrial Engineering 
and Technology 
       Optical  Science 
    Civil Engineering          Veterinary Studies 
   Geomatic  Engineering         Public  Health 
    Electrical and Electronic Engineering 
and Technology 
       Radiography 
    Aerospace Engineering and Technology          Rehabilitation Therapies 
    Maritime Engineering and Technology          Complementary Therapies 
    Other Engineering and Related 
Technologies 
       Other  Health 
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Table 1.4 
BROAD AND NARROW FIELDS OF EDUCATION (continued) 
  Broad Field  Narrow Field        Broad Field  Narrow Field 
7.  Education  Teacher Education      9.  Society and Culture (continued)  Economics and Econometrics 
    Curriculum and Education Studies          Sport and Recreation 
    Other Education          Other Society and Culture 
8.  Management and Commerce  Accounting      10.  Creative Arts  Performing Arts 
    Business and Management          Visual Arts and Crafts 
    Sales and Marketing          Graphic and Design Studies 
    Tourism          Communication and Media Studies 
    Office Studies          Other Creative Arts 
    Banking, Finance and Related Fields      11.  Food, Hospitality and Personal 
Services 
Food and Hospitality 
    Other Management and Commerce          Personal Services 
9.  Society and Culture  Political Science and Policy Studies      12.  Mixed Field Programmes  General Education Programmes 
    Studies in Human Society          Social Skills Programmes 
    Human Welfare Studies and Services          Employment Skills Programmes 
    Behavioural Science          Other Mixed Field Programmes 
   Law          
   Language  and  Literature          
    Philosophy and Religious Studies           
Source: Department of Education, Science and Training (2002d).  
Remuneration data for United Kingdom Vice-Chancellors is from the Times 
Higher Education Supplement for the 2001/2002 year.
26  Remuneration refers to the 
year ended 31 July 2002 and includes salary and other benefits but excludes 
superannuation contributions made by the university.  The data covers 162 institutions.  
Remuneration data for United States Presidents is sourced from the Chronicle of Higher 
Education for the 2001-2 year.
27  The data covers private college Presidents only and is 
taken from the Form 990 that each institution is required to file with the Internal 
Revenue Service and includes pay (defined as salaries, fees, bonuses and severance 
payments) and benefits (including health and pension plans) as well as other fringe 
benefits that are required to be counted as income by the Internal Revenue Service.  In 
addition, deferred compensation paid or designated in the year is also included.  Cases 
where the institution did not provide information for a particular category have also 
been included in the dataset.  There are 594 observations in the dataset. 
 
Data on the rankings of Australian Universities in the top 500 worldwide was 
obtained from the rankings provided by Shanghai Jiao Tong University for 2004.  The 
system does not produce a specific ranking after the top 100, instead providing a 
grouping of universities with the same rank range.  There are 14 Australian universities 
listed in the top 500 worldwide. 
 
1.7  Summary 
This dissertation investigates issues in Australian universities and the market for 
Vice-Chancellors in Australia using a unique dataset comprised predominantly from the 
annual reports of universities.  In theory, this data should be easily obtained, in practice, 
the data is surprisingly difficult to get hold of.  Additionally, other data has been used to 
extend the analysis and the variables of interest, including data on Vice-Chancellors and 
university Presidents overseas and another novel dataset, made up of interviews with 
Vice-Chancellors themselves. 
                                                 
26 This was published in the Times Higher Education Supplement on 7 February 2003.  The Times Higher 
Education Supplement is available online at http://www.thes.co.uk. 
27 Available at http://chronicle.com/stats/990/.  
CHAPTER 4 
 
DIMENSIONS OF EARNINGS QUALITY 
2  TITLE 4 
 
2.1  Introduction 
What does the term “earnings quality” mean?  To some, it means whether the 
underlying accounting procedures satisfy the relevant accounting standards.  To others, 
the term relates to the persistence of earnings and its impact upon the market and relates 
to the accrual and cash flow components of earnings. 
 
Why should we be interested in earnings quality?  There may be benefits to high 
earnings quality for universities in reputation effects (or the flipside, the negative effects 
on reputation from bad earnings quality), the allocation of funding or the decisions 
made by students in choosing where to study. 
 
To address the first interpretation of earnings quality, we look at the occurrence 
of audit qualifications to university financial statements.  The intuition behind this is 
that where the underlying accounting procedures do not satisfy the relevant accounting 
standards and other legislative requirements, this will result in an audit qualification. 
 
In terms of the second interpretation, we look at this from two angles: firstly, the 
distribution of earnings.  What is the distribution of earnings for universities?  If the 
corporate model is transposable to universities, then the expectation is that the 
distribution will be kinked at zero (which is taken to suggest some form of earnings 
management occurring in corporations).  To round off the analysis of earnings quality, 
we also use accruals as a measure of earnings quality.  In addition, we investigate 
earnings persistence for universities.  The evidence from firms shows that earnings 
backed by accruals are less persistent than those backed by cash flows (Sloan, 1996).  
Given the argument that Vice-Chancellors may not be able to exercise the same sort of 




2.2  Audit Qualifications 
Universities are governed by state legislation but for reporting purposes are also 
required to adhere to Commonwealth Guidelines issued by the Department of Education, 
Science and Training (DEST).  All the universities in the sample were audited by the 
relevant state Auditor-General, with the exception of Australian Catholic University 
(being a company limited by guarantee) who were audited by KPMG.  Note, however, 
that this is but a small influence on the entire sample due to only one university-year 
being included due to data availability issues.  Table 2.1 shows the incidence of audit 
qualifications for these institutions. 
 
What is interesting from Table 2.1 is that the incidence of audit qualifications 
increases in 1998, implying that earnings quality decreases in 1998.  The t-statistic for 
equality between 1997 and 1998 audit qualifications is -2.96 (p-value .00).  Analysis of 
the audit reports shows that in this year, the dominant grounds for the (“except for”, 
panel D) qualification were that the Auditor-General was unable to confirm as an asset 
the receivable recognised by the university from the Commonwealth government to 
cover the costs associated with the university’s unfunded superannuation liability.
28  
Other institutions had an unqualified report with an “inherent uncertainty” (panel F) 
concerning the amount owing for the university’s contribution to the unfunded 
superannuation liability for state superannuation schemes.
29    It appears that the 
difference between a qualified and unqualified report was the recognition of the 
receivable as an asset on the balance sheet.  In later years, another main cause for 
qualification related to the treatment of Commonwealth government grants received in 
advance.  The Guidelines issued by DEST required that these grants be treated as 
income in advance, while the Auditor-General (working to Australian Accounting 
Standards) believed that these should be recognised in the year of receipt and hence 
                                                 
28 An “except for” opinion indicates that certain circumstances exist, that in the auditor’s opinion are 
material or are likely to be material, however they are not of such magnitude or so pervasive or 
fundamental as to effect the subject matter as a whole. The following circumstances may result in an 
“except for” opinion: (i) disagreement with management; (ii) scope limitation; and (iii) a conflict between 
the identified framework.  An “inability to form” an opinion indicates that the auditor is unable to express 
an opinion on the subject matter as a whole.  This may occur if a scope limitation exists, where sufficient 
appropriate audit evidence cannot be reasonably obtained and the possible effects of any adjustments 
might be of such magnitude or so pervasive or fundamental to the subject matter (Australian Accounting 
Research Foundation, 2002). 
29 Comments to unqualified reports include an “inherent uncertainty”, where there is potential for a matter 
to affect the financial report that is not so remote as to make its disclosure irrelevant, however, at the date 
of signing the audit report the outcome is contingent upon future events and is not capable of reasonable 
measurement.  An “emphasis of matter” is a section of the auditor’s report that draws attention to or 
highlights a matter that is relevant to the users of the audit report but it is not of such a nature that it 
affects the audit opinion (Australian Accounting Research Foundation, 2002).  
qualified the reports.  The drop off in qualified audits in 2002 is due in part to an 
alignment of the Guidelines with Australian Accounting Standards concerning the 
treatment of the superannuation liability (DEST, 2002b).  DEST did note in previous 
years’ Guidelines that “the accounting treatment adopted by an institution is a matter of 
professional judgement for each institution” (Department of Education, Training and 
Youth Affairs, 2000), hence it is likely that those that received a qualified report did so 
after consideration of the costs of doing so against the benefits of more representative 
accounts.  Hence, it is uncertain that an audit qualification is evidence of low audit 
quality.  In addition, it is expected that the incidence of audit qualifications will fall 
further in the future as UIG Abstract 51 concerning the unfunded superannuation 
liability of universities was issued and came into effect in late 2002 (Australian 
Accounting Standards Board, 2002), resolving the other main cause for university audit 
qualifications.  The flip side to this is that future qualifications are likely to reflect more 
serious violations of the relevant accounting standards. 
 
An analysis of the Reports provided by the New South Wales,
30 Queensland, 
Victoria and Western Australia Auditor-Generals on audits completed for the year 
ended 31 December 2003 (Audit Office of New South Wales, 2004; Queensland Audit 
Office, 2004; Auditor General Victoria, 2004; Auditor General for Western Australia, 
2004) shows that overall, five of the twenty-eight audits completed resulted in an audit 
qualification (18 percent).  Of the five qualified audit opinions, three are for non-
compliance with the AAS 15: Revenue requirement for the recognition of grant 
revenues (Swinburne, Ballarat and Melbourne).  Of the remainder, RMIT received an 
“inability to form an opinion” due to inadequate or inaccurate accounting records 
produced by the Academic Management System and Curtin University received a 
qualification as an effective reconciliation of student fee debtors to the general ledger 
was not achieved.  Additionally, an opinion could not be formed on whether student fee 
debtors, allowance for doubtful debts and general account cash assets were fairly 
presented.  If the qualifications concerning grant revenues are excluded, then the 
proportion of qualified reports drops to 8 percent for 2003. 
                                                 
30 The audit of UNSW is incomplete due to significant unreconciled items in the bank reconciliation and 
deficiencies in systems and controls in the bank reconciliation process.  
Table 2.1 









A.  Qualifications by Year 
1995 11  0  .00 
1996 31  2  .06 
1997 32  1  .03 
1998 30  9  .30 
1999 31  11  .35 
2000 32  10  .31 
2001 31  11  .35 
2002 31  4  .13 
B.  Qualifications by Region 
ACT 14  5  .36 
NSW 72  4  .06 
NT 8  1  .13 
QLD 35  0  .00 
SA 9  1  .11 
TAS 7  0  .00 
VIC 55  34  .62 
WA 29  3  .10 
C.  Group of Eight versus Non-Group of Eight 
Go8 56  16  .29 
Non-Go8 173  32  .18 
D.  Qualification Types by Year 
 Except  for 
Inability 
to Form  Other 
1995  - - - 
1996  2 - - 
1997
1 1  1  - 
1998 8  1  - 
1999 10  1  - 
2000 9  1  - 
2001
2 10  -  1 
2002  4 - - 
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E.  Qualifications Types by Region 
 Except  for 
Unable 
to Form  Other 
ACT
1 2  4  - 
NSW 3  -  1 
NT  1 - - 
QLD  - - - 
SA  1 - - 
TAS  - - - 
VIC  34 - - 
WA 3  -  - 






1995 1  -   
1996 10  -   
1997 10  -   
1998 10  1   
1999 9  -   
2000 1  -   
2001 -  -   
2002 -  1   
1 The university had two different (“except for” and “unable to form”) 
qualifications made to its 1997 financials. 
2 The Auditor-General was of the opinion that the University had the 
capacity to dominate decision making and hence should have included 
the assets and liabilities of some entities in the consolidated results. 
 
Panel B of Table 2.1 shows that the majority of these qualifications occurred in 
Victoria, which suggests that on average, Victorian universities have lower earnings 
quality than those in other regions.  Despite all Auditor-Generals working to the same 
set of Australian Accounting Standards, it is possible that this variation is capturing 
audit quality rather than earnings quality.  Panel E shows the types of audit 
qualifications by state.  It appears that where a Victorian university received a 
qualification, this was an “except for” opinion.  Looking at the incidence of comments 
to unqualified reports, all instances where an “inherent uncertainty” was expressed were 
made by the New South Wales Auditor-General.
31   Panel C shows that, counter to 
expectations, the Group of Eight universities have a higher proportion of qualified 
                                                 
31 The “emphasis of matter” was made by the South Australian Auditor-General and the Auditor-General 
for Western Australia made a “matter of significance” (equivalent to an “emphasis of matter”) in 2002.  
reports, indicating lower earnings quality, relative to non-Group of Eight universities.  
The t-statistic for equality between Group of Eight and non-Group of Eight is -1.49 (p-
value .07).  This is further explored using the other connotation of earnings quality. 
 
2.3  The Distribution of Earnings 
An empirical regularity found in the corporate sector is that there is a “kink” in 
the earnings distribution around zero, with more firms reporting small positive earnings 
relative to those reporting small negative earnings than would be expected in a 
“smooth” distribution (Hayn, 1995, Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997).  Is this the case for 
universities?  An alternative hypothesis is that universities have incentives to report flat 
or even small losses rather than high earnings of either sign.  The intuition behind this is 
that there is a disincentive to report large positive earnings, as this leaves universities 
with less opportunity to raise fees (which we have seen universities making decisions on 
in relation to HECS in 2004) or seek donations.  However, large negative earnings 
reflect badly on the performance of the Vice-Chancellor. 
 
To analyse the distribution of earnings, we use both a raw and scaled earnings 
measure.  The scaled measure is computed as: 
 
  it it ET A  
 
where for university i at time t , E is earnings and TAis average total assets. 
 
From Figure 2.1, Panel A, the distribution of raw earnings is highly skewed to 
the right, with more positive earnings results than negative.  There is also a strong kink 
at zero.  In panel B, once we control for size, there is still some evidence of skewness in 
the distribution, but it is not as extreme.  An arrow has been placed in both panels to 
highlight the kink in the distribution.  Interestingly, we see some evidence of a kink at 
zero, although the kink appears weaker.  Figure 2.1 lends support to the proposition that 
although universities do not have a profit motive, they still face incentives to avoid 
reporting losses just like their corporate counterparts, as there are few cases of negative 
earnings.  Rather, the distribution appears asymmetric with a long positively skewed 
tail.  What are the restrictions on the earnings capabilities of universities?  Perhaps 
universities do not set out to maximise earnings, but to maximise revenues, subject to a  
profit constraint (Baumol, 1958, 1959).
32  Balkrishna (2004) finds that loss incidence 
for Australian firms over the period 1991-2004 stands at 37 percent, with an average 
reported loss of 32 cents.  This contrasts strongly with the situation for universities 
where loss incidence stands at 16 percent with an average loss of 1 cent.
33  Although 
there does not seem to be any major pattern for Australian firms, it is interesting to 
compare the university experience where these institutions seldom report losses, with 
that of private sector companies, where losses do not appear to be a rare occurrence.
34 
 
Healy (1985) proposes a “big bath” theory, where there is a negative relationship 
between earnings and turnover as incoming managers take big write-offs to increase the 
probability of reporting positive earnings in the future.  Leone and van Horn (1999) also 
find evidence of a relationship between earnings and turnover for nonprofits.  Applied 
to the university context, this implies higher turnover for universities with positive 
earnings as the Vice-Chancellor manipulates earnings to look good in the year of 
departure for reputation considerations and the prospect of higher retirement payments.  
We investigate the relationship between earnings and turnover by looking at the 
earnings in the period [ ] 1, 1 −+  relative to the year (t0 = ) of turnover.  We split the 
sample into three groups: those reporting losses, those reporting flat earnings and those 
reporting turnover.  The results are shown in Table 2.2. 
 
From Table 2.2, the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between 
earnings and Vice-Chancellor turnover cannot be rejected.  There appears to be little 
evidence of performance related turnover for poor performance in the market for Vice-
Chancellors, which differs from the corporate experience.  The finding also suggests 
that there is no evidence of a link between positive earnings and turnover, inconsistent 
with Leone and van Horn (1999).  However, this could also arise if performance is not 
evaluated on earnings, which is plausible, given that these institutions are classified as 
nonprofits. 
 
                                                 
32 This is further explored in Chapter 6: Other Performance Dimensions of Universities. 
33 Deflated by average total assets. 
34 Balkrishna (2004) looks at 6,230 observations from the Aspect database over the period 1991-2004.  
Observations missing one of more variables have been eliminated.  The one percent extremes of 
observations for operating profit after tax, market value of equity and book value of equity all on a per-
share basis) are excluded.  Figures are based on operating loss after tax deflated by opening total assets.  
Figure 2.1 
EARNINGS DISTRIBUTION FOR UNIVERSITIES 
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NUMBER OF VICE-CHANCELLOR TURNOVERS 
CONTINGENT ON EARNINGS 
Earnings/Average Total Assets,  it x   Total 
Earnings Relative to
Year of Turnover
(t = 0 is year of 
VC turnover) it x. 0 1 < − it .01 x .01 − ≤< + it x. 0 1 ≥+  
-1 3      13  13    28 
0 2      11  20    33 
1 1          6  23    31 
Total 6      30  56    92 
The 
2 χ  statistic for independence between row and column frequencies is .167 (p-
value .997). 
 
2.4  Earnings Quality: The Case of Accruals 
The modern literature on earnings quality from the viewpoint of firms looks at 
the case of accruals and the distribution of earnings.  Sloan (1996) investigates whether 
stock prices reflect information about future earnings contained in the cash flow and  
accrual components of current earnings.  To analyse the persistence of earnings (E), 
Sloan relates earnings in year t to those in t1 +   by estimating the model 
t1 0 1 t t1 EE ++ =α +α +υ , where  1 α   is the persistence coefficient which takes higher 
values the more persistent are earnings.  He finds earnings persistence of .84 for US 
firms.  However, when broken down into the accrual and cash flow components, he 
finds that the cash flow component of earnings is consistently more persistent than the 
accrual component.  He also finds evidence of mean reversion in earnings, with faster 
mean reversion when accruals are high.  Reid (2004) looks at this for Australian firms 
and finds a similar result.
35  He finds that earnings persistence for Australian firms is 
lower than that for US firms, at .76.  Consistent with Sloan, he finds the cash flow 
component of earnings is more persistent than the accrual component. 
 
Leone and van Horn (1999) find evidence that management in nonprofits 
manipulate earnings to avoid losses.  They argue that because of the limited use of 
performance based earnings incentives, earnings are managed for reputational reasons 
as compensation grows by moving from smaller to larger organisations.  In the 
Australian market, Vice-Chancellors have moved from their position at one university 
to take up the position of Vice-Chancellor at another.
36 
 
Accruals are commonly regarded as the mechanism through which management 
manage earnings.  In this sense they lower earnings quality as they provide incentives 
for managerial opportunism.  However, accruals are not in themselves sinister, as they 
can also improve earnings quality by mitigating volatility in cash flows to better reflect 
performance (Dechow and Schrand, 2004). 
 
We analyse accruals using two measures based on Dechow (1994) as seen in 
                                                 
35 Reid (2004) looks at listed Australian companies from 1989-2003.  His sample covers 6,130 firm years. 
36 For example, Professor Davis at Griffith leaves to take up the role of Vice-Chancellor at the University 
of Melbourne in 2005.  The current Vice-Chancellor of the University of Tasmania, Professor Le Grew, 
was formerly the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Canterbury (New Zealand).  Professor McNicol 
(Tasmania) was formerly at the University of Sydney, prior to this he was the Vice-Chancellor at the 
University of New England.  The current Vice-Chancellor at the University of Sydney, Professor Brown, 
was formerly the Vice-Chancellor at the University of Adelaide.  Professor Hay at the University of 
Queensland was formerly at Deakin University, Professor Chubb at ANU was a former Vice-Chancellor 
at Flinders, Professor McWha at the University of Adelaide the former Vice-Chancellor at Massey 
University (New Zealand); former Vice-Chancellor Professor Blake at the institution was also previously 
Vice-Chancellor at Charles Sturt, Professor Mortley at Bond University from the University of Newcastle 
and Professor Holmes at Newcastle the former Vice-Chancellor at Northern Territory University.  Former 
Vice-Chancellor at the University of Melbourne, Professor Gilbert, also held the position at the 
University of Tasmania.  Former Vice-Chancellor at the University of Western Australia, Professor 
Schreuder, came to the role from his position as Vice-Chancellor at the University of Western Sydney.  
equation (4.1): 
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where for university i at time t , AA is aggregate accruals; E is earnings; CFOis cash 
flow from operations and CFI cash flows from investing, with scaling by average total 
assets to standardise.  The first measure only considers depreciation but not the effect of 
capital expenditure.  The second measure adjusts for this. 
 
For each year, we rank the institutions on each accrual measure, where more 
negative accruals indicate higher earnings quality.  We then average the rankings for 
each university to compute an average rank for each university.  This is shown in Table 
2.3.  Note that more negative accruals indicates higher quality earnings and hence a 
higher rank. 
 
In Table 2.3, columns (1) and (2) show each university’s average rank on the 
first measure of accruals in equation (2.1) while columns (3) and (4) show the average 
rank on the second measure of accruals.  While there appears to be a rearrangement of 
relative rankings between the two measures, the institutions that rank best and worst on 
both measures of accruals remain the same.  Australian Catholic University (ACU) has 
the highest quality earnings when judged on accruals, while Central Queensland 
University has the lowest quality earnings.  Caution should be taken when interpreting 
the findings for ACU, however, as there is only one institution year in the sample.  It is, 
however, interesting that ACU is also the only institution that is not audited by the 
Auditor-General.  Rather, ACU, being a private company, was audited by KPMG.   
Unfortunately there is insufficient data to speculate on whether private sector auditors 
have more stringent procedures and hence result in higher earnings quality or whether 
this is a result of the heavier handed regulation afforded to companies by the 
Corporations Act. 
 
When moving to the second, more extensive accruals measure, the University of 
Western Australia moves up a large amount relative to the first accruals measure, while 
Griffith University moves down.  This highlights the importance of looking at both 
measures of accruals.  In the private sector, major corporate accounting scandals have  
occurred due to companies moving items from operations to investing activities.
37  This 
would, all else equal, lead to a drop in relative ranking as seen with Griffith. 
 
To see if there is any evidence of mean reversion in accruals, we plot the 
accruals for the top and bottom four ranking institutions over time where observations 
are available over seven years (the maximum time period) in Figure 2.2.  As can be seen, 
there is some support for mean reversion of accruals.  For the top ranking institutions, 
Murdoch University goes against this trend, having consistently negative accruals for 
the period looked at.  The remaining institutions, however, follow much the same 
process of a rapid reversal of high accruals in 1998.  For the bottom ranking institutions, 
the plot looks similar.  The University of Southern Queensland ranks poorly due to a 
sustained period of positive accruals, although it too, eventually mean reverts.  The 
other institutions also undergo a reversal in 1998.  The plot indicates that their high 
relative rankings are due to high accruals in 1996 and 1997, rather than sustained high 
positive accruals. 
 
Panel B of Figure 2.2 gives the results for the second measure of accruals.  Mean 
reversion is also seen, although this differs from Panel A in that accruals tend to drift 
around zero.  For the top ranking universities, Panel A shows that the process of mean 
reversion is incomplete, however Panel B shows that they tend to revert more strongly 
to zero.  Again, institutions’ ranks seem to be a result of early period accruals.  It is also 
of interest to observe that for the bottom ranking institutions, there is more variation in 
the year of initial reversion toward the mean. 
 
The pattern of accruals is inconsistent with the findings from audit 
qualifications.  In 1998, earnings quality as measured by accruals improves.  However, 
if we look at earnings quality from an audit report point of view, in 1998, earnings 
quality decreases.  The statement by the Victorian Minster for Finance may provide 
some insight; in 1998 he provides explanatory notes to the statements, believing that the 
receivable from the Commonwealth relating to the unfunded superannuation liability is 
                                                 
37   For example, WorldCom’s $3.8 billion accounting fraud.  The telecommunications company 
improperly manipulated earnings.  One of the major methods used to do this was through “line cost” 
expenses.  These represent the fees WorldCom paid to third party telecommunication network providers 
for the right to access their networks.  Under Generally Accepted Accounting Priciples, these must be 
expensed and not capitalised.  However, WorldCom initially reduced the accrued line cost expense and 
then began to capitalise this expense, effectively moving the charge from profits to the balance sheet (and 
from cash flows from operations to investing) (U.S Securities and Exchange Commission, 2002).  
an asset and that the Auditor-General’s approach is misleading as it misrepresents the 
financial position of the university (Auditor-General of Victoria, 1999).  This would not 
be inconsistent with the findings presented here: the incidence of audit qualifications is 
an artefact of the accounting system, while earnings quality improves as a result of 
universities recognising the receivable from the Commonwealth to better reflect the 
operations and underlying position of the university.  This indicates that universities 
may have had to trade off the costs associated with an audit qualification against the 
benefits of more representative results. 
 
Looking specifically at the first measure of accruals, Figure 2.3 shows the 
relationship between accruals and cash flow from operations, scaling by average total 
assets, for these institutions over time.  There is a strong negative relationship between 
the two, consistent with the findings from the corporate literature.  The correlation 
coefficient between accruals and cash flows is -.98 and the regression equation indicates 
that for each additional dollar of accruals, cash flow falls by 95 cents on average.
38  
Further analysis shows that accruals tend to be larger when cash flows are negative than 
when they are positive, which lends support to the theory that universities, even though 
they do not have a profit motive, face strong incentives to avoid reporting negative 
earnings.  The cluster of observations in the upper left quadrant is consistent with the 
finding that the distribution of earnings has a centre of gravity around small positive 
values close to zero, as shown in panel B of Figure 2.1.  There is one outlier, 
corresponding to Curtin University’s 2001 results.  In this year, the university received 
an audit qualification regarding the unfunded superannuation liability.  The University 
recognised the expected future Commonwealth government funding associated with the 
liability as a receivable on the balance sheet.  The Auditor-General qualified the report 
on the basis that the University did not exercise control over future Commonwealth 
government funding and hence the funds should not have been recognised as an asset.  
The effect on the financial statements was to overstate net assets and revenue by $77 
million.  If revenue had been correctly reported, the University would have reported a 
net loss of $8 million instead of the $69 million net profit reported (Auditor General for 
Western Australia, 2002).  The overall result from this analysis is that universities report 
flat or small positive earnings results, consistent with the intuition discussed in Section 
4.3 on the distribution of earnings. 
                                                 
38 The correlation coefficient is significant at 1 percent (one-tailed test).  
Table 2.3 
UNIVERSITY ACCRUAL RANKINGS 
  ( )
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 University  Score      University  Score 
 (1)  (2)      (3)  (4) 
1.  Australian Catholic University  1.0      1. Australian Catholic University  4.0 
2.  University of the Sunshine Coast  4.0      2. University of New England  7.7 
3.  University of Wollongong  6.1      3. Australian National University  8.9 
4. RMIT  8.8      4. Murdoch  University  9.0 
5. Murdoch  University  8.9      5. RMIT  9.0 
6.  Griffith University  11.3      6. University of Sydney  10.4 
7.  Charles Sturt University  12.0      7. University of South Australia  10.5 
8.  University of Queensland  12.0      8. University of Canberra  11.6 
9.  University of South Australia  12.0      9. Victoria University  11.9 
10.  Queensland University of Technology  12.5      10. University of Queensland  13.0 
11.  University of Newcastle  12.6      11. University of Western Australia  13.1 
12.  Swinburne University of Technology  13.1      12. University of Western Sydney  13.3 
13.  University of Western Sydney  13.2      13. University of Wollongong  13.4 
14.  La Trobe University  13.3      14. University of Newcastle  13.9 
15.  Australian National University  13.6      15. University of New South Wales  14.6 
16.  University of Ballarat  14.4      16. Charles Sturt University  14.7 
17.  Victoria University  15.0      17. Edith Cowan University  15.3 
18.  University of New England  15.4      18. Curtin University of Technology  15.6 
19.  Deakin University  16.0      19. University of Adelaide  16.0 
20.  University of New South Wales  16.0      20. University of Melbourne  16.4 
21.  Edith Cowan University  16.1      21. James Cook University  16.7 
22.  University of Canberra  17.3      22. La Trobe University  16.7 
23.  University of Melbourne  17.3      23. University of the Sunshine Coast  17.0 
      Continued on next page…  
Table 2.3 
UNIVERSITY ACCRUAL RANKINGS (continued) 
  ( )
1
it it it it AA E CFO TA =−    
   ( )
2
it it it it it AA E CFO CFI TA =− −    
 University  Score      University  Score 
 (1)  (2)      (3)  (4) 
24.  University of Tasmania  17.4      24. Northern Territory University  17.4 
25.  University of Sydney  17.7      25. Macquarie University  17.9 
26.  University of Technology Sydney  17.7      26. Deakin University  19.0 
27.  Macquarie University  17.9      27. Queensland University of Technology  19.0 
28.  Curtin University of Technology  18.0      28. Southern Cross University  19.4 
29.  Northern Territory University  19.1      29. University of Ballarat  19.7 
30.  University of Adelaide  19.1      30. Monash University  19.9 
31.  University of Western Australia  19.1      31. Swinburne University of Technology  20.1 
32.  James Cook University  19.9      32. University of Tasmania  20.1 
33.  Monash University  20.7      33. University of Technology Sydney  20.9 
34.  Southern Cross University  22.0      34. Griffith University  27.0 
35.  University of Southern Queensland  26.6      35. University of Southern Queensland  27.0 
36.  Central Queensland University  28.5      36. Central Queensland University  29.5 




UNIVERSITY ACCRUAL MEASURES THROUGH TIME 
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Figure 2.3 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CASH FLOW AND ACCRUALS 















Figure 2.4, panel A looks at whether there is any evidence of a state effect in 
accruals by calculating average accruals for each state in year t  and comparing this 
across states.  Due to data considerations, South Australia, Tasmania and the Northern 
Territory are not included in this analysis.  If we use the common wisdom in the finance 
literature that negative accruals indicates high quality earnings, then it appears from 
panel A of Figure 2.4 that in the mid to late 1990s, universities in Western Australia had 
higher quality earnings on average than those of other states, while those in Queensland 
had lower quality earnings, although this effect disappears over time as earnings quality 
appears to be converging between states.  Overall, accruals decrease (i.e. earnings 
quality increases), consistent with the idea that universities are facing increased 
corporatisation pressures over time.  As universities fall under state legislation but are 
also required to comply with Commonwealth issued directions (such as the Guidelines 
issued by DEST), the variation in earnings quality on a state level indicates that local 
rather than general effects were dominant factors influencing earnings quality, although 
the importance of these has disappeared over time.  
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Figure 2.4 
FURTHER ANALYSIS OF ACCRUALS 
A.  Accruals by State 
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Panel B of Figure 2.4 looks at whether there is any evidence of a Group of Eight 
effect in earnings quality.  Their website notes that these universities “represent 
Australia’s leading universities”.  Given the importance of reputational effects in research 
output and success in grant funding,
39 we would expect their earnings to be of higher 
quality than non-Group of Eight universities.  We analyse this by comparing the Group of 




The evidence shows that over time, earnings quality has improved for both Group 
of Eight and non-Group of Eight universities, consistent with what would be expected 
from increased corporatisation pressure.  However, while in the mid to late 1990s, the 
Group of Eight universities had, on average, higher earnings quality than their 
counterparts, this has slowly changed over time.  In 2000, earnings quality was similar.  
However, in later years non-Group of Eight institutions have higher earnings quality than 
Group of Eight institutions.  This may indicate that these institutions are responding more 
actively on average to corporatisation pressures by improving the quality of their earnings 
relative to the Group of Eight universities.  Alternatively, it may mean that the greater 
prestige associated with the Group of Eight insulates them somewhat from 
corporatisation pressures.  Further, the larger improvement in earnings quality of non-
Group of Eight universities relative to Group of Eight universities is consistent with the 
findings from the analysis of audit qualifications; that non-Group of Eight institutions 
have had larger improvements in earnings quality and hence have a lower incidence of 
audit qualifications. 
 
                                                 
39 The Group of Eight universities receive over 70 percent of national competitive research grants and 
conduct over 60 percent of all Australian university research.  They are partners in more than 80 percent of 
the Australian government’s Co-operative Research Centres (CRCs) and attract over 50 percent of CRC 
funding provided to universities.  They host more than half of Australia’s major research facilities, produce 
over 60 percent of Australian university research publications and two-thirds of patents, hold over 90 
percent of US patents for inventions generated by Australian universities, generate over 80 percent of the 
most highly cited Australian university publications, dominate university links with industry, undertaking 
over 50 percent of applied research and 60 percent of experimental development and attract nearly 60 
percent of competitive International Postgraduate Research Scholarships (Group of Eight Limited, 2004). 
40 Comparable results are obtained when using the second accruals measure.  
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One possible qualification to this analysis is that the accruals measure may be 
capturing a “cry poor” effect – the larger the cash flows relative to earnings, the higher 
the quality.  However, overall, the analysis of earnings quality over time is not 
inconsistent with the theory that universities are responding to corporatisation pressures 
by improving earnings quality.  In addition, there appear to be greater accruals when cash 
flow from operations are negative, consistent with the theory that Vice-Chancellors face 
incentives to avoid reporting losses.  There is also evidence that the influences on 
earnings quality have changed over time with quality now being determined by general 
rather than local effects.  Finally, the analysis shows that non-Group of Eight institutions 
have, over time, improved the quality of their earnings relative to the Group of Eight 
universities. 
 
2.5  Earnings Persistence 
According to Dechow and Schrand (2004), earnings are of high quality if they are 
predictable, persistent and reflect the underlying intrinsic value of the firm.  Earnings 
persistence is meaningful for earnings quality only if earnings truly reflect performance 
during the period and current period performance will persist to future periods.  For 
universities, it is debatable whether a single measure such as earnings reflects 
performance (such as their ability to attract future funding revenue), given that 
universities lack the single onus of corporates and do not have a profit-making objective.  
However, if universities are indeed becoming more like firms, then what are the 
implications for this measure? 
 
To analyse earnings persistence, we use the framework used by Sloan (1996), 
shown in equations (4.2) and (4.3): 
 




i,t 1 0 1 it 2 i,t 1 EC F O A A ++ =β +β +β +ε , (2.3) 
 
where for university i  at  time  t ,  E  is  earnings; CFO   is cash flows from operations;  
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n AA  is a measure of accruals where n1 , 2 =  to differentiate between the two accrual 
measures and ε is a random error term.  All variables are standardised by deflating by 
average total assets to control for differences in size.  Equation (2.3) splits earnings into 
the two components and allows the coefficients to differ.  Summary statistics are shown 
in Table 2.4 and the regression results are shown in Table 2.5.  The regression data is 




Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Standard  deviation
Earnings .02 .12  -.05  .02 
Cash flow from Operations  -.00 .11  -.40  .11 
1 AA   .02 .42 -.07  .11 
2 AA   .07 .51 -.03  .12 




(standard errors in parentheses) 
Variable/Coefficient Coefficient
2 R df 
A.   i,t 1 0 1 it i,t 1 EE + + = α+ α + ε  
Intercept  0 α   .01 (.00)  
E   1 α   .24 (.07) .05 186 




i,t 1 0 1 it 2 i,t 1 EC F O A A ++ = β+ β + β + ε  
Intercept  0 β   .01 (.00)  
CFO   1 β   .21 (.07)  





i,t 1 0 1 it 2 i,t 1 EC F O A A ++ = β+ β + β + ε  
Intercept  0 γ   .01 (.00)  
CFO   1 γ   .08 (.04)  
2 AA    2 γ   .10 (.04) .05 185 
F statistic for  12 β= β is 3.01 (p-value .08).  
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The interpretation of Table 2.5, Panel A, is that for every dollar of earnings this 
year, on average, 24 cents persists to the following year.  This appears to be a rather low 
level of earnings persistence compared to firms.
41  When we remove the constraint that 
the accrual and cash backed components of earnings have the same level of persistence in 
Panel B, we find that the accrual backed component of earnings appears to have higher 
persistence than that backed by cash - the complete opposite to that found in the private 
sector.  However, the hypothesis that the two components have the same level of 
persistence is only weakly rejected. 
 
A possible explanation for this result is that while firms have the single onus of 
maximising shareholder wealth, the onus for universities is multi-dimensional.  It is 
possible that the differences in the way these two types of institutions operate leads to the 
findings above.  Although for universities as a whole, earnings persistence is low, given 
that the hypothesis that the cash and accruals component of earnings have equal 
persistence cannot be rejected, it may be that for universities, the use of accruals is not 
motivated by managerial opportunism or earnings management, but is used to smooth 
irrelevant cash flows and hence provide a better quality earnings number.  This would be 
consistent with the previous finding that earnings quality for universities is improving 
over time.  Perhaps the finding that there is little evidence of opportunistic accruals is not 
surprising, given that corporate earnings are typically framed within a 
valuation/forecasting setting, which is not entirely relevant for universities.  An important 
point to note is that lack of consistency in the behaviour of universities and corporations 
does not necessarily indicate that Vice-Chancellors do not engage in earnings 
management, but rather suggests that earnings management, if it exists for universities, is 
not conducted in the same manner as in the private sector.  Alternatively, this could be 
the result of omitted variables, as the concept of earnings does not hold the same weight 
for universities as for firms.  However, this does not explain why the earnings distribution 
(in Figure 2.1) displays a kink.  Dechow et al. (2003) offer alternative explanations for 
                                                 
41  Sloan (1996) finds persistence of .84 for US firms while Reid (2004) finds persistence of .76 for 
Australian firms.  
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this kink, including that it may be a result of management taking real actions to improve 
performance, such that the kink may reflect efficient contracting, or that the kink may be 
accentuated by the holding of financial assets that earn non-negative returns. 
 
2.6  Summary 
Why do universities care about the quality of earnings?  Perhaps as universities 
face increased revenue and cost pressures over time they have had to become more 
accountable for their operations.  A high quality earnings figure may be associated with 
prestige, or conversely, universities avoid having low quality earnings to avoid the costs 
associated with a qualified audit opinion on the grounds of earnings management.   
However, it is highly likely that earnings only play part of the story.  Given the role of 
universities, it is probable that non-financial factors
42  are equally (or possibly more) 
important.  Alternatively, high quality earnings may enable an institution to attract higher 
quality Vice-Chancellors, Chancellors or other senior staff.  Given that Chancellors tend 
to be external appointments and many of these individuals are held in high regard by the 
community, having a high quality earnings number may enable the institution to attract 
better candidates, as these individuals also have reputation effects to consider when 
deciding whether or not to accept the role. 
 
The results from the analysis of earnings quality are not inconsistent with the 
theory that universities are facing increased corporatisation pressures over time.  They 
have responded to this by improving earnings quality.  There is also evidence that like 
firms, universities face incentives to avoid reporting losses, even though there appears to 
be no relationship between earnings and turnover.  Earnings quality also appears to be 
driven by local, rather than national forces, although over time the local effect appears to 
have diminished in importance to the point where earnings quality is roughly equivalent 
across states, suggesting that national forces dominate.  Earnings persistence for 
universities is also low and unlike the corporate model, there is no support for differential 
persistence of the cash flow relative to the accrual component.  It appears that accruals 
are not used for earnings management purposes by Vice-Chancellors, but rather are used 
                                                 
42 Discussed in Chapter 6: Other Performance Dimensions of Universities.  
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to improve earnings quality, consistent with the finding that audit qualifications are not 
necessarily evidence of low earnings quality. 
 